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REMEMBERING SHELLEY v. KRAEMER: OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WORLDS*
FRANCIS A. ALLEN**
As far as I know, no one has made a serious effort to measure the
influence exerted by "great cases" on the way lawyers and judges per-
ceive the law and the society of which it is part. Certainly, great cases
constitute prominent features in the intellectual landscapes of most le-
gally trained persons. Such cases supply symbols and guideposts, and
may sometimes act as limitations on thought. Their influence is not
purely intellectual, however; they provide drama and emotional colora-
tion as well.
Any effort to define the impact of great cases on thought and feeling is
complicated by the fact that cases earn the appellation "great" for many
and varied reasons.1 A case may be great because it announces legal
propositions containing the seeds of growth, holdings that are the genesis
of important developments in private or public law. In this connection
one may think of Powell v. Alabama.2 Decided in 1932, Powell justly
may be seen as the source of an important body of new legal doctrine-
the constitutional law of criminal procedure as practiced by state systems
of justice.3 Yet a case may be great, not because it provides the basis for
significant doctrinal developments, but rather, as in Dred Scott,4 because
it displays the existence of irrepressible conflicts of moral principle and
* Based on opening address given at Washington University School of Law on September 29,
1988 at a conference commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
** Professor of Law, University of Florida. I wish to acknowledge the assistance and helpful
suggestions of two faculty colleagues in the University of Florida College of Law, Professors Barry
A. Currier and Michael J. Moorhead. I wish also to thank Robert Munro of the College of Law's
library staff for efficient and time consuming efforts in collecting the historical materials.
1. These matters were briefly adverted to many years ago in Allen, The Supreme Court and
State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 191 (1958).
2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (failure to appoint counsel to defendant accused of felony is a denial of
due process).
3. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975
U. ILL. L.F. 518, 522-42; Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal
Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REV. 213, 217-19 (1959).
4. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Whether the abortion case, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), will be so remembered remains to be seen.
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social interest, differences incapable of being repaired or resolved by
litigation.
Some cases are great because of the sheer drama involved in witnessing
the state's effort to pull a prominent public figure from his pedestal and
subject him to the rigors of penal sanctions. One thinks of the prosecu-
tion of Oscar Wilde in England5 and perhaps that of Aaron Burr in this
country.6 More perversely, we may include within our classification
cases that rivet attention simply because of the heinous nature of the acts
with which defendants are charged-prosecutions like those of Lizzie
Borden in Massachusetts7 or Henri Landru in France.'
Great constitutional cases have their own special attributes. Typically,
they touch upon a broad range of interests and issues. The interests often
take on a different significance with the passage of time, and therefore the
"meaning" of great cases cannot be defined once and for all. In this re-
spect, the search for meaning in great constitutional cases resembles the
similar search in great works of art. Perceptions and understandings
change over time, and the significance of Shelley v. Kraemer today may
not be what it was for the participants in the litigation forty years ago.
In my judgment, Shelley v. Kraemer9 and its companion cases10 are
entitled to be included in the category of great cases. The calling of this
conference forty years after the 1948 decisions provides substantial cor-
roboration for this conclusion. Yet the judgment is subject to qualifica-
tions, and some persons may reject it outright.
Perhaps the most persuasive claim for the designation rests with the
immediate social impact of the decision. The holding effectively elimi-
nated enforcement of racially restrictive covenants from the arsenal of
devices employed by those committed to the achievement of racial segre-
gation in urban residential housing. The cancerous growth of the cove-
nant system had advanced far by 1948. Even more significant is that, but
for Shelley v. Kraemer, the ghettoizing of American cities would soon
have gone much further, and the racial covenant system would have be-
come a leading feature, not only of northern cities, but of the burgeoning
5. R. ELLMAN, OSCAR WILDE (1988).
6. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
7. F. SPIERING, LIZZIE (1984).
8. Allen, Henri Landru, 13 ENCY. BRIT. 661 (1971).
9. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
10. McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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urban areas of the South as well. 1
But Shelley may be remembered for other reasons. One of the most
useful published studies of the case to date focuses, not on the social
impact of its holding, but rather on the influence of private groups associ-
ated with the litigation in achieving significant constitutional change.12
The important role of such groups as the NAACP in collecting social
data, initiating litigation, and piloting the cases through the obstacles
surrounding Supreme Court review may have special significance for us
today as we observe the phenomena of group activity in an election year.
Yet for all the interest in and significance of the Shelley litigation, it is
only realistic to say that a cloud of skepticism, and even of hostility,
hangs over Chief Justice Vinson's 1948 opinion. The skepticism reflects
no sympathy for the racial covenant system, but rather is directed to the
viability of the opinion as a constitutional precedent. An interesting
change has occurred in the attitude in law review literature toward the
constitutional theory employed by the Chief Justice in the Shelley case.
The theory that equitable enforcement of private restrictive agreements
violates fourteenth amendment rights of the excluded persons was not an
innovation of the Court. It had been widely expounded in the law re-
views-most notably in the well known article of Professor D.O.
McGovneyP 3-in legal briefs, 4 and in dissenting opinions in lower
courts. 5 With a single exception, the law review exegesis favored the
11. "If this trend continues unchecked, almost all new residential sections of our cities will be
barred, within ten or twenty years, and to an increasing degree by other groups." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 38-39, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (No. 72) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States].
12. C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE N.A.A.C.P., AND THE RE-
STRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1973). See also Vose, N.A.A.C.P. Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6
W. REs. L. REV. 101 (1955). Modem research is adding further insights into the role of the
NAACP in the covenant cases. See Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of
the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 737 (1989).
13. McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Cove-
nants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 5 (1945). See also, e.g., Groner
and Helfeld, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426 (1948); Kahen, Validity of Anti-
Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsideration of the Problem, 12 U. CHI. L. REV. 198 (1945).
14. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra, note 11, at 48; Consolidated Brief for the Peti-
tioners at 10, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (Nos. 290 and 291) [hereinafter Petitioners' Con-
solidated Brief].
15. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233, 237-40 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Edgerton, J., dissenting). Cf
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), which raised the question of judicial enforcement as a
violation of constitutional right. The Supreme Court concluded that the issue was not properly
before it, but also indicated doubt about the validity of the argument.
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theory and urged its acceptance by the courts.16
Soon after the Supreme Court's opinion, however, legal scholars began
to express doubts.17 The literature raised questions as to whether the
Shelley opinion stated an intelligible principle useful for future constitu-
tional development. Certainly the courts have been wary of the Shelley
precedent; the case has overtly influenced subsequent constitutional adju-
dication much less strongly than was widely anticipated at the time of its
decision.II A distinguished teacher of constitutional law recently told me
that he no longer assigns Shelley for classroom discussion. Apparently,
for many competent observers, Shelley v. Kraemer is a classic instance of
great cases making bad law.
In the remarks that follow, I shall try to accomplish two tasks. First,
to the extent possible, I should like to place Shelley in its historical con-
text and, in some measure, present the case as it was seen by those who
witnessed or participated in the decision. Second, I shall attempt to
throw some light on why the theoretical issues called forth by these cases
are difficult. In short, my purposes consist of providing a prologue for
the conference; and I, like you, look forward to the more meticulous dis-
cussions to follow.
II.
The passage of forty years in a dynamic society leaves few institutions
and attitudes untouched. But the years 1948 to 1988 are particularly
momentous, for they constitute a watershed in the law of race relations in
the United States. Shelley v. Kraemer and its companion cases were liti-
gated in the years immediately following the Second World War, a war
16. The exception is a thoughtful student piece. See Note, State Court Enforcement of Race
Restrictive Covenants as State Action within Scope of Fourteenth Amendment, 45 MICH. L. REV. 733
(1947).
17. See, e.g., Haber, Notes on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 811
(1964); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 474 (1962);
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959). Cf. Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant
Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1949); Scanlon, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values
Versus Human Values, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 157 (1949).
18. Selected U.S. Supreme Court cases influenced by the Shelley holding are: Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetary, 349
U.S. 70 (1955); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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fought by the United States with military forces largely segregated on
racial grounds. 9 The public policy of many American states was frankly
segregationist, and in many northern states, where racial equality was
ostensibly recognized by law, civil rights legislation enacted in the years
following the Civil War was largely ignored and unenforced. The Illinois
legislature defeated a proposal to invalidate racially restrictive covenants
only a few months before the Supreme Court spoke the Shelley case.20
Prior to Shelley, the structure of racial discrimination by law at state
and local levels received little interference from the Supreme Court of the
United States. The fourteenth amendment, adopted in 1868, and in-
tended by its framers as a bastion for the protection of minority rights,
failed largely of its purpose well into the twentieth century. To be sure,
the Court in 1917 outlawed racial zoning by state law.21 It also struck
down the purposeful exclusion of black persons from state jury service.
However, the unrealistic evidentiary standards subsequently imposed by
the Court on those attempting to prove purposeful exclusion by state
authority largely negated this result.22 A study published in 1912 an-
nounced the failure of the fourteenth amendment as a protector of civil
rights and characterized it instead as a source of privilege for private
economic interests and corporate enterprise.23
Although it is familiar history, one may still feel shock when faced
with the formidable tolerance displayed by the Supreme Court toward
state legislative efforts to construct systems of racial segregation in the
years following ratification of the fourteenth amendment. Statutes bar-
ring interracial marriage abounded in the South, and were not invali-
dated until nearly twenty years after the Shelley decision.24 Racial
19. By World War 11 the military had developed a racial stereotype of the Negro soldier-
a military version of white supremacy-that exerted a strong influence on the use of black
manpower. Military planners constantly stated that their racial policies were based upon
the requirements of efficiency and that they were not concerned with social problems or
social theories. The opposite was in fact the truth. Negro soldiers were restricted to cer-
tain kinds of military duty because of a widespread belief in their inherent racial inferiority.
R. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES 3 (1969).
20. Kahen, supra note 13, at 210, n.50.
21. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (city ordinance forbidding blacks from living on
predominantly white blocks unconstitutional). See also City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704
(1930); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
22. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). But see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Thomas v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909).
23. C. COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES (1912).
24. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). The antimiscegenation laws were finally invali-
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separation in public transportation and, some thought, public educa-
tion,25 was sanctioned by Plessy v. Ferguson's doctrine of "separate but
equal."' 26 Although Jim Crow was under attack in 1948, it was alive and
apparently well in large areas of the United States. It is said that
Thurgood Marshall, while special counsel for the NAACP, urged his col-
leagues not to place great reliance on appeals to public policy when at-
tacking racially restrictive covenants in court. The reason was simple
and persuasive: eighty percent of the black population of the country
then lived in jurisdictions in which state public policy expressly em-
braced the goal of racial segregation." Shelley was litigated before the
civil rights movement entered the phase of public protest. The road that
was to lead to Brown v. Board of Education " seemed rocky and uncer-
tain and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s was more than a decade
away.
It helps to note these realities when considering the Shelley v. Kraemer
decision. One is tempted, in looking back over the last forty years, to
believe that the destruction of legal supports sustaining racial segregation
in the United States was inevitable and foreordained. Not only does this
easy assumption distort the atmosphere experienced by those participat-
ing in the cases, but it also overlooks the crucial importance of Shelley in
bolstering morale and providing impetus for the civil rights struggles in
the following decades.
Despite sobering social and legal realities, however, 1948 was a time of
hope and optimism. For many persons, American involvement in World
War II constituted a crusade to defend the human rights placed in jeop-
ardy by the Nazi regime. For many who had undergone the wartime
experience, a commitment to advance human rights abroad implied a
similar purpose at home. The disposition of the new Court that had
emerged since 1937, while not fully tested on racial issues, appeared sym-
pathetic to that objective. Already, the succession of cases that was ulti-
mately to lead to Brown v. Board of Education was passing through the
dated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court had failed earlier to take similar action in
the much criticized case of Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
25. But note the statement in the Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 59 n.3 1: "It may
be observed, however, that this Court has never had the occasion to rule directly on the question
whether compulsory segregation in education, even where substantially equal facilities are afforded,
is a denial of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment."
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. Vose, supra note 12, at 111.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Court.2 9 For some, the Court's new willingness to test the fairness and
decency of state criminal procedures against the mandates of the four-
teenth amendment was a favorable augury. The rationale of those hold-
ings rarely referred overtly to racial discrimination, but the Court's
awareness of racial abuse could be detected just below the surface of the
decisions. The smoldering language of Chief Justice Hughes, speaking
for the Court in Brown v. Mississippi, forcefully demonstrates this
perception.30
There were other grounds for optimism. One was the emergence of
private groups, especially the NAACP, which after often disheartening
experiences, had acquired impressive skills in conducting civil rights liti-
gation. The experience, intelligence and persistence of the NAACP con-
tributed impressively to the morale of those attacking the covenant
system and to the ultimate outcomes of the cases.31
Finally, the position of the federal government toward the covenant
litigation deserves attention. President Harry Truman played a critical
role in the history of the American civil rights movement, a fact that may
have perhaps faded from many memories. It was the Truman adminis-
tration that made important moves to desegregate the military forces.32
The President himself called for new and affirmative attitudes toward
problems of racial discrimination-attitudes that bore fruit in later civil
rights legislation.3 3 In December, 1946, he appointed the President's
Committee on Civil Rights, which produced the widely read pamphlet
entitled To Secure These Rights, a document of continuing contemporary
significance. 34 The Truman Justice Department filed an impressive ami-
29. Thus, just a week before the argument in the restrictive covenant cases, the Court heard
argument in Sipuel v. Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), a case involving
the right of a black applicant to be admitted to a state law school. See also Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S.
147 (1948).
30. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
31. See supra note 12.
32. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-1948) (President Harry S. Truman, July 26,
1948) (establishing the President's Committee on Equal Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services). See also R. DALFIUME, supra note 19, at 4: "[I]t was one of the first federal actions against
segregation, coming six years before the 1954 school desegregation decision. The example of accom-
plishing integration by executive authority also provided a precedent for the Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson administrations."
33. President Truman, speaking at the 38th Annual Conference of the NAACP on June 29,
1947, said: "The extension of civil rights today means not protection of the people against the Gov-
ernment, but protection of the people by the Government." Vose, supra note 12, at 171. See also J.
DANIELS, THE MAN OF INDEPENDENCE 336-46 (1950).
34. The President's Committee was established by presidential executive order on December 5,
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cus brief in Shelley, and the Solicitor General appeared in the oral argu-
ment of the cases in support of petitioners' position. It is pleasant to
recall that there once were Justice Departments of this sort.
As in most great contests of principle, those attacking the racial cove-
nant system in the 1940s acted in an atmosphere comprised of doubts
and hopes. The legal and social obstacles to success appeared formida-
ble, but deeply held convictions sustained courage and motivated effort.
III.
Restrictive covenants are created by agreements among owners of real
estate to limit the uses made of the designated properties.35 For the
agreements to be effective over the long term, successors in title to the
properties, like the original signatories, must be bound by the terms of
the covenant. Such equitable restrictions are familiar tools for real estate
development in this country, and may affect, for example, the kinds of
structures or the sizes of the lots permitted in the restricted area. Use of
the equitable restriction as a device to control the racial or religious at-
tributes of those who own or occupy real estate dates back to the last
century. 36 The racial covenant, however, became widespread only after
the Supreme Court of the United States, in Buchanan v. Warley,37 out-
lawed racial zoning by municipal ordinance. In every realistic sense, the
racial covenants represented conscious efforts to achieve the objectives of
racial or religious zoning in urban housing while, at the same time, evad-
ing the literal limits of Buchanan.
From the vantage point of the 1980s, the success of the racial covenant
system in state and lower federal courts is nothing short of astonishing.
As the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson for the Court in Shelley rightly
stated, the racial covenant did not restrict the use to which the affected
property was to be put-that use, after all, was residential occupancy.
What was restricted were the classes of people permitted to use the prop-
erty." In other words, use was not restricted, but rather who was to use.
1945. Exec. Order No. 9808, 3 C.F.R. 590 (1943-1948). The pamphlet was widely cited at the time
and frequent references to it are made in petitioners' briefs in the restrictive covenant cases.
35. A brief summary of the principal elements of equitable-servitude doctrine may be found in
French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1261, 1276, 1281 (1982).
36. See, e.g., Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892).
37. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See supra note 21.
38. [T]hese covenants do not seek to proscribe any particular use of the affected properties.
Use of the properties for residential occupancy, as such, is not forbidden. The restrictions
[Vol. 67:709
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But with disheartening unanimity, the courts enforced and maintained
the covenant system.
The personal and social consequences of the racial covenant system
and its potential for greatly enlarged future harm were well understood
in 1948. Even before 1930, groups like the NAACP had identified the
racial covenant as a significant peril.39 Perhaps more surprising, a com-
mission appointed by President Herbert Hoover warned in 1932 of the
social pathologies created by racial discrimination in residential hous-
ing." It was not, and never has been, the position of foes of the covenant
system that the restrictive agreements were the sole cause either of the
urban ghetto or of the human and social costs resulting from the condi-
tions of life prevailing there.41 Nor, I believe, would those who combated
the covenant system in 1948 have been particularly surprised to learn
that forty years later newspaper headlines would still be announcing ab-
rasive controversies involving race and housing. The opponents of racial
covenants, however, recognized restrictive agreements not only as instru-
ments of egregious discrimination, but also as potent devices for enforce-
ment and enlargement of racial segregation in the United States. A
statement published in 1947 that racially restrictive covenants were "the
principal instrument of residential segregation in the North"'42 seems
hardly overdrawn.
World War II elevated the problem of low cost housing to one of na-
tional concern, and focused attention on the distortion of the real estate
market caused by the covenant system. The migration of thousands of
black workers, attracted to northern cities by war industries, enlarged
initial deficits of low priced dwellings in those cities into critical
shortages that persisted in the years following the war. Black migrants
were confined to the restricted black areas in their search for housing.
Those financially able to purchase decent accommodations in other parts
of the city were nevertheless required to remain in the ghetto and com-
of these agreements, rather, are directed toward a designated class of persons and seek to
determine who may and who may not own or make use of the properties for residential
purposes.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
39. C. VOSE, supra note 12, at 54.
40. Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 29.
41. "The unfortunate truth is that Negro ghettos will not disappear overnight if judicial en-
forcement of restrictive covenants is denied." Petitioners' Consolidated Brief, supra note 14, at 97-
98.
42. Weaver, Community Action Against Segregation, 13 Soc. ACTION 18 (Jan. 15, 1947), quoted
in Petitioners' Consolidated Brief, supra note 14, at 49.
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pete with the less affluent for available dwellings. This produced, among
other problems, overcrowding and soaring rentals. In Baltimore, twenty
percent of the city's'population was herded into two percent of the
homes.43 90,000 persons per square mile were living in Chicago's black
belt as compared to 20,000 in the adjacent white apartment areas.44 In
New York's notorious "lung block," population density was of a rate
sufficient to accommodate the existing population of the United States on
one-half of New York City's land area.45 Overcrowding brought with it
the accompanying pathologies of disease, mental illness, crime, inade-
quate city services, frustration and despair. The iron law of supply and
demand operated to inflate the costs of ghetto accommodations. One
contemporary study asserted: "Negro residents of the Chicago 'Black
Belt' pay as much per cubic foot per room as that paid by wealthy resi-
dents for equivalent space on the Lakeside Drive."' 46 The vices of the
covenant system, however, were as much moral as social and economic.
Discrimination created and perpetuated by racially restrictive covenants
is peculiarly irresponsible. However persuasive the critique of the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine, however clear that separate is rarely equal, the
doctrine at least recognizes, in the public sphere, a constitutional govern-
mental obligation to serve the needs of the minority groups. In contrast,
American courts, treating the covenant system as wholly private in its
origins and operation, freed all groups, public and private, that nurtured
the system, from any responsibility for the harm done to the excluded
classes and to broader social interests.47 Indeed, it must be assumed that
many persons in the groups promoting the covenant system were the
most adamantly opposed to governmental programs, like public housing,
designed to alleviate the havoc created by the restrictive agreements. 48
Whether, therefore, the racial covenant system under attack in the
43. Groner and Helfeld, supra note 13, at 428.
44. 1 S. DRAKE & H. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS 204 (1962).
45. Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 13.
46. Cayton, Negro Housing in Action, Soc. AcTIoN 18 (Apr. 5, 1940), quoted in Groner and
Helfeld, supra note 13, at 432 n.27.
47. It must be stressed that if white people insist on segregation-and if society is assumed
not to tolerate costly sub-standard housing for Negroes-the logical conclusion is that, in a
planned and orderly way, either areas of old housing now inhabited by whites or vacant land
must be made available for Negroes.
G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 627 (1962) (emphasis in original).
48. A recital of the difficulties created by the racial covenants in the administration of the
federal public housing programs is included in Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 5-10.
See also Groner and Helfeld, supra note 13, at 436.
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Shelley litigation is viewed from the social, economic, or moral perspec-
tive, great issues were raised and great interests were at stake. How the
Supreme Court would resolve the issues was properly seen as of high
national importance.
IV.
In the following remarks, I shall present some personal recollections of
the covenant cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. My van-
tage point was that of a law clerk for Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the
Court's opinions in Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge. I would be
wrong to dignify what follows with the label "history." The remarks are
chiefly the product of memory, and may well contain distortions charac-
teristic of such accounts. My only warranty is that what I shall say rep-
resents my best recollection.
Chief Justice Vinson voted to grant certiorari in all the covenant cases,
believing that the results below should probably be reversed. Despite the
action, I was concerned about the strength of his resolve. Law clerks, of
course, often are convinced that their wisdom is superior to that of the
judges who employ them; most, including me, did not scruple about
making his views known to the judge while a case was under considera-
tion. Some observers of the Court have viewed the law clerk's role with
alarm. My observation is that a judge has little difficulty in resisting the
urgings of her clerks when it suits her purposes to do so. Certainly, this
was true of Chief Justice Vinson.
The character and attributes of the Chief Justice form an important
part of the Shelley story.4 9 He was a man of high native intelligence. He
had been in public life nearly all of his mature years, a career that in-
cluded truly distinguished service as a Congressman, a period as a war-
time administrator in the executive branch, membership in the Truman
cabinet, and a five-year term as member of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. His thought processes relied less on reading and pri-
vate meditation than on oral exchange. He possessed a remarkable talent
for absorbing complex ideas by ear, an attribute no doubt sharpened by
his years in Congress. My unease about the solidity of the Vinson vote
was based on the realization that he had not yet gone through his charac-
teristic process of spoken exchange, so important to his decisionmaking.
49. Allen, Chief Justice Vinson and the Theory of Constitutional Government: A Tentative Ap-
praisal, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 3 (1954).
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The Chief's tentative position appeared to rest mainly on his scanning of
the impressive dissenting opinion in Hlurd v. Hodge written by Judge
Henry W. Edgerton,5" a man whom Vinson had known as a colleague on
the court of appeals and greatly admired.
Feeling uneasy about the Chief's commitment to reverse the lower
court judgments in the covenant cases, I, in my youthful arrogance, felt
called upon to do what I could to "nail down" the Vinson vote for rever-
sal. Accordingly, during the hot summer of 1947, and to the considera-
ble neglect of my newly acquired bride, I devoted long hours to the
preparation of a memorandum addressed to the Chief Justice in which I
attempted to canvass the principal issues posed by the cases and to artic-
ulate persuasively the arguments favoring the constitutional invalidity of
the covenant system. By summer's end the memo had grown impres-
sively in size, along with my pride of authorship. My vanity set the stage
for one of the most deflating experiences of my professional life. When
the Chief returned to Washington in September, I delivered the memo to
him with considerable aplomb. A day or two later I was summoned to
his chambers. As soon as I entered the room, I detected signs of distur-
bance on the Chief's expressive face. "You know," he said, "when I left
here in June I thought I was going to vote to reverse in the covenant
cases. After reading your memo, I'm not so sure."
The oral arguments in the cases held on January 15 and 16, 1948, may
have strengthened the Chief's resolve to reverse the lower court deci-
sions. Viewed simply as a forensic performance, the advantage was all on
the petitioners' side. The lawyers defending enforcement of the cove-
nants were, in many instances, engaged in real estate practice in the cities
from which the cases arose, practices that likely included few appear-
ances in appellate forums. Petitioners, on the other hand, were repre-
sented by some of the country's most distinguished and tested veterans of
civil rights litigation. Thurgood Marshall, a familiar figure at the Court's
lectern, delivered a typically elegant and articulate argument. Marshall's
co-counsel, Loren Miller, employed a style that verged on the pedagogic,
but which was nevertheless lucid and persuasive. The presentation that I
remember most vividly, however, was that of Charles H. Houston. Mr.
Houston was nearing the end of a distinguished career that included ser-
vice as full-time counsel for the NAACP and dean of the Howard Uni-
50. 162 F.2d 233, 235-46 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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versity Law School." In his argument he succeeded impressively in
combining intellectual strength with moral force, and in communicating
a sense of personal integrity.
Some four months after the arguments, opinions in the restrictive cov-
enant cases were handed down. I believe that certain of Chief Justice
Vinson's convictions and attributes strongly influenced the form and con-
tent of the opinions. Mr. Vinson was a man of strong institutional loyal-
ties. He believed that divisions on the Court had endangered its
authority and prestige in the recent past. He was apprehensive about the
consequences, both to the Court and the country, of a decision invalidat-
ing enforcement of racial covenants announced by a tribunal fragmented
as to result or constitutional theory. It is my impression that one of the
Chief's central objectives, therefore, was that the decision be as nearly as
possible unanimous, and that the Court speak with one voice. A circum-
stance favorable to that objective was the decisions of Justices Reed,
Jackson, and Rutledge to remove themselves from participation in the
cases. None stated publicly his reasons for the withdrawal, but it was
generally assumed that each of the three Justices owned property bur-
dened by a racial covenant. 2 The Chief's objective of consensus was
largely achieved. In the state cases, no concurring or dissenting opinions
were written. In the District of Columbia cases, the line was breached
only by a brief concurrence by Justice Frankfurter. 3
The Chief's assumptions, I believe, also contributed to the Shelley
opinion's minimalist posture. A persistent criticism of the opinion has
been that it gives inadequate guidance for the application of the Shelley
precedent in later cases. Perhaps one may find in the opinion an effort to
limit what was said to the prevailing consensus on the Court, to accom-
plish the reversal of the judgments in the instant cases, leaving for an-
other day, when division and controversy might be less damaging, the
difficult problems of application to different facts. Again, the quest for
consensus may have influenced the Court in choosing the equal protec-
tion clause as the constitutional ground for the decision. The selection
51. A sketch of Mr. Houston's career is to be found in C. VOSE, supra note 12, at 43-44.
52. The action of Justice Rutledge, in particular, appeared puzzling. As a member of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, he sat in a case involving a racial restriction, and filed a brief
concurring opinion. Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Later, as a member of the
U.S. Supreme Court, he participated in the Court's action that resulted in denial of certiorari in
Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In that action, he joined Justice Murphy's opinion
that certiorari should have been granted. Mays v. Burgess, 325 U.S. 868 (1945).
53. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 36 (1948).
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may have been surprising in view of earlier decisions of the Court invali-
dating racial zoning squarely on due process grounds. Recall, however,
that the struggle on the Court to free state regulatory powers from the
toils of substantive due process doctrine was very recent history in
1948."4 Reliance on that doctrine, even in the wholly different context of
Shelley, might well have sparked resistance from some of the Chief's
colleagues.
It was important to the Chief Justice that the opinion not "reach" for
its result, that the argument of the Court, insofar as possible, rely on
familiar and established assumptions of constitutional law. The Court's
opinion virtually ignored social data, assiduously collected in the briefs,
concerning the impact of the covenant system on the human lives.55 The
Court also ignored contentions that enforcement of the covenants was
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, to which the United
States had only recently subscribed.56 Instead, the opinion focused on
the traditional concepts of "state action" in fourteenth amendment law.
The covenants themselves, said the Court, were the product of private
activity and, as such, fell outside the scope of the constitutional man-
dates. The fourteenth amendment was violated, if at all, by the action of
the states in enforcing the covenants. One consequence of the sharp di-
chotomy between public and private was to absolve the states of all re-
sponsibility for the creation of the covenant system. It is possible, too,
that the dichotomy as stated failed to give due weight to then recent
developments in the constitutional definitions of state action.57
However this may be, the opinion found the requisite state action in
the enforcement of the covenants by state courts of equity. Among the
factors apparently important to the conclusion were that the state courts
were proceeding pursuant to state common law rules, that equitable pow-
ers were being employed directly against the parties subject to discrimi-
54. Thus, it was just over a decade earlier that the Court, by a 5-4 vote, sustained the validity of
a state regulation of women's wages. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
55. See Petitioners' Consolidated Brief, supra note 14 and Brief for the United States, supra
note 11.
56. Shortly before the Shelley decision, the Ontario High Court had invalidated a restrictive
covenant directed to "Jews, or to persons of objectionable nationality" through reliance, in part, on
the U.N. Charter, which requires its signatories to promote "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." Re Drummond Wren 4 D.L.R. 674 (1957). But cf. Re Noble and Wolf 4 D.L.R. 123
(1948).
57. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. CM L. REv. 1 (1948).
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nation on grounds of race,5" and that the transactions being invalidated
by the state courts were those between "a willing seller and a willing
buyer," thus frustrating the effort of the seller to ignore racial criteria in
the sale of his land.59 Clearly, too, the fact that minority groups might
hypothetically enter into restrictive agreements barring Caucasians from
residential occupancy was to be accorded no significance in defining the
protection of equal protection. 6°
V.
It is perhaps ironic that the Shelley opinion, which sought so conscien-
tiously to rely on traditional rules of public law, has been the target of
critics who find the opinion lacking in the essential attributes of the rule
of law. Space does not permit a scrupulous review of the critical litera-
ture that has emerged since the decision of Shelley forty years ago. 61 In-
stead, I shall sketch an approach to the Shelley opinion, in the hope that
the comments will assist in identifying some serious issues to which the
case has given rise.
Some who have pondered the Shelley case have characterized it as in-
volving a conflict between liberty and equality. I prefer to state the mat-
ter somewhat differently. For me, the underlying problems in Shelley are
those of defining the boundaries separating the private from the public
worlds.62 Any society basing its polity on the value of the human indi-
58. The point, as it bears on standing to assert the rights of the person excluded from ownership
and occupancy of real property, proved to be of crucial importance to Chief Justice Vinson. See his
dissenting opinion in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 260-69 (1953). Interestingly, the distinction
drawn by the Chief Justice between equitable enforcement against the minority member and an
action for damages against one who had signed the restrictive agreement was suggested in the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Edgerton in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Judge Edger-
ton stated: "To say that the Constitution forbids direct and actual enforcement of a racial covenant
by injunction ... is not to say that it forbids awarding to a neighboring property owner such dam-
ages, if any, as an executed sale to a Negro may be shown to have caused." Id. at 240 n. 22 (Edger-
ton, J., dissenting).
59. This point has been emphasized in one interesting rationale of the Shelley decision. See
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
60. In the course of making the point, the Court in Shelley states: "Equal protection of the laws
is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." 334 U.S. at 22. In years gone by
when I was teaching the course in constitutional law, I discovered that a remarkable diversity of
answers was forthcoming when the class was asked to interpret the sentence. I should not like to
spoil the game, in the event it is still being played, by commenting further on it.
61. A portion of the literature is cited supra at note 17.
62. The comments that immediately follow have been substantially influenced by the essay of
Professor Louis Henkin, published over a quarter century ago. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes
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vidual must recognize an area of action, solitude, meditation, and inti-
mate relationships that is immune from the intervention of state power-
an area, in the language of the famous Wolfenden Report, that "is, in
brief and crude terms, not the law's business. ' 63 It betrays no secret to
say that the borders of the private world are under great pressure in mod-
em American society.'r One cause of this is the extreme and increasing
disparity of power between government and corporate wealth, on the one
hand, and private individuals, on the other. For example, the command
of electronic and computer technology in the public sector constitutes an
unremitting peril to the integrity of the private world, even when the
purposes of those controlling the technology are benign. Unfortunately,
recent history makes clear that the purposes are often not benign.65
Of equal importance in explaining the modern assault on the private
world is that the interests and values assigned to that world are contin-
gent, not absolute, in nature. Although preservation of the immunity of
the home from state invasion is important, we are not likely to concede
that a homemaker is privileged to maintain her property in such an un-
sanitary condition as to threaten the health of the community. The diffi-
culty resides in the fact that acts committed in private often produce
serious public ills. Nor is there an adequate calculus to determine when
and to what extent state power may properly invade the boundaries of
the private world in the interest of public concerns. Thus, rightly or
wrongly, we have criminalized the sale and consumption of narcotic
drugs in defense of perceived public interests. The costs of this policy
include the regular penetration of official force into areas of private con-
cern in ways undreamed of by our forebears. In the United States, as-
saults on the citadel are conducted for the most part by persons who
concede the importance of the private world, but who in the particular
instance contend that the value of public intervention exceeds its costs.
Increasingly, in recent years, the values sought to be achieved by public
intervention have seemed more tangible and urgent than the rather
for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962). I have not attempted to acknowledge my
indebtedness to him at each step ofmy argument. It may be assumed, however, that the obligation is
considerable.
63. ALLEN, Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Eclipse of Private Worlds, in THE FUTURE OF
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 151-75 (1984).
64. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution 79-80 (Home Office,
Scottish Home Department) (1957).
65. J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT OF AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY,
passim (1982).
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amorphous claims made in behalf of the private world. 6 6
As critical as is the tendency in modem America for governmental and
societal power to constrict the borders of the private world, there are
contrasting problems. For just as the private can be misconceived as the
public, so may the public be disguised as the private. Indeed, one of the
persistent tendencies of our history is the effort of powerful groups whose
activities are of prime public concern to escape public scrutiny and con-
tainment by claiming the immunities of the private world. The principal
analytic weakness of the Shelley opinion may be its insistence on the
strict dichotomy between the making of restrictive agreements, which is
seen as wholly private, and the judicial enforcement of the covenants,
which is seen as public action. The inadequacy of the classification be-
comes apparent when one sees that the agreements involved in the litiga-
tion, which involved only a limited number of residences,67 were
nevertheless part of broad and comprehensive systems of segregation.
Moreover, the systems of segregation could not have functioned without
active governmental participation at all levels, from creation of the re-
strictions to their enforcement.
One cannot determine precisely how widespread the use of racial cove-
nants in the northern cities had become when Shelley was decided. The
absence of adequate statistical knowledge constitutes a curious gap in the
social research of the time. In Chicago, for example, it was stated that
eighty percent of the properties in the city had been made subject to the
covenants. 68 Scholars have doubted this figure,69 but it is clear that cov-
erage of properties on the periphery of the black belt was very nearly
complete. 70 Nor can one doubt that the use of the covenants was ex-
panding significantly, both in Chicago and in many other American
cities.7 '
More important than coverage statistics, however, is the degree to
66. See P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 22 (1949): "On the whole
the active proselyting interests have been given greater sanctuary [in our law] than the quiet virtues
or the right of privacy."
67. Thus, in the District of Columbia cases the agreement encompassed twenty lots. Eleven
lots in the same block were not included. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1948).
68 Iron Ring in Housing, 27 THE CRISIS 205 (1940), quoted in Note, supra note 16, at 736 n.6.
See also S. DRAKE & H. CAYTON, supra note 44, at 187; Groner and Helfeld, supra note 13, at 430
n.21.
69. Kahen, supra note 13, at 204 n.27.
70. "[By 1937] over 95 per cent of the frontage [adjacent to middle class neighborhoods] was
reported covered by restrictive covenants." S. DRAKE & H. CAYTON, supra note 44, at 187.
71. See supra note 44.
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which the covenant system penetrated the very fibers of social life in the
cities where it prevailed. Something of the impact of the system on the
living conditions of the black and white populations of Chicago can be
gleaned by revisiting such works as the classic study of Drake and
Cayton, Black Metropolis.72 Our knowledge of the dynamics of social life
and political processes counsels that no such system can emerge, flourish,
and expand without the active support of local governments. The evi-
dence suggests that, in the language of the criminal law, the governments
aided and abetted the creation and operation of the covenant system. As
aiders and abettors, they may be viewed as legally and constitutionally
accountable for the systems that resulted. The case for accessorial re-
sponsibility is perhaps stronger here than in the criminal law, for, in
criminal cases, accountability does not depend on a showing that but for
the accessory's behavior the forbidden result would not have occurred.73
In the covenant cases, however, it seems relatively clear that without the
element of governmental participation, the system could hardly have
emerged or flourished.
This is not to say that simply because of state enforcement of the cove-
nants, other property owners were encouraged to enter into restrictive
agreements. Such encouragement is a possible consequence any time a
contract is enforced. Rather, the aiding and abetting referred to are the
myriad acts-some overt, some sub rosa-performed by persons wield-
ing public power which were intended or had the effect of expanding the
covenant system. The role of the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in
creating and perpetuating the system is suggestive, even though it reflects
national rather than local governmental power. The FHA, which en-
gaged in insuring the liolders of mortgage loans against loss, was a pow-
erful factor in local real estate markets in the post-war world. By
insisting on the presence of racial covenants in the transactions it ap-
proved, the agency became a formidable engine for creating and perpetu-
ating the covenant system.74 Evidence of similar activity by local officials
72. See supra note 44.
73. See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney General v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 69, 15 So. 722, 732 (1894).
74. The role of the FHA was widely recognized at the time. Thus, G. MYRDAL, supra note 17,
at 625-26, states:
The Federal Housing Administration, in effect, extends credit to Negroes only if they build
or buy in Negro neighborhoods and to whites only if they build in white areas which are
under covenant not to rent or sell to Negroes. This policy of the F.H.A. is the more
important since it has been an ambition and accomplishment of this agency to make hous-
ing credit available to low income groups. The effect has probably been to bring about an
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is harder to find. Stories were current in my younger years in Chicago of
City Hall bringing pressure to bear against banks to withhold mortgage
funds on properties lacking racial covenants. It must be said in all con-
science, however, that local financial institutions ordinarily seemed to re-
quire little prodding.
Basic to understanding the role of governmental action in maintaining
the covenant system is the perception that the patterns of residential seg-
regation, created and perpetuated in substantial part by the restrictive
agreements, constituted the status quo upon which local political power
rested. In large American cities, the distribution of political power is
typically determined by considerations of ethnicity and geography. In
Chicago, for example, white politicians perceived the migration of sub-
stantial numbers of black persons from the ghetto to other parts of the
city-which did occur to some degree after the Shelley decision-as
acute threats to their power bases. For similar reasons, some black poli-
ticians were less than pleased by the prospect of their constituents fleeing
across the ghetto's boundaries .7  Thus, local office holders possessed
powerful motives to support and strengthen the covenant system. To
doubt that, inevitably, these motives determined governmental action re-
quires disregard of hard-earned knowledge of our social and political
environment.
If this view of the genesis and evolution of the covenant system is ac-
cepted, then state action was involved in the creation of the restrictive
agreements. It would seem to follow that, just as the legislatively created
racial ordinances were invalidated in Buchanan v. Warley, the restrictive
agreements in Shelley must also fall under the fourteenth amendment's
ban. No such comprehensive approach was presented to the Court in
1948, although some of the advocacy of the time may have reflected simi-
extension of such 'protection' to areas and groups of white people as were earlier without
it.
See also Groner and Helfeld, supra note 13, at 436-37; Vose, supra note 12, at 191. In 1949, it was
charged that "discrimination is indulged in today as freely as ever on F.H.A.-insured loans." Id. at
225.
75. A contemporary report on the political dynamics described above may be found in S.
DRAKE & H. CAYTON, supra note 44, at 201:
During the campaign against restrictive covenants, one prominent Negro leader confirmed
to an interviewer: 'Sure, I'm against covenants. They are criminal. But I don't want Ne-
groes moving about all over town. I just want to add little pieces to the Black Belt. I'd
never get re-elected if Negroes were all scattered about. The white people wouldn't vote
for me.'
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lar perceptions.76 There is no reason to believe that the Court would
have based its own decision on the argument, had it been fully presented.
There are, of course, formidable problems of proof; what we know with
substantial certainty as practical sociologists and political scientists often
resists translation into juridical facts. For my own part, I believe the
conclusion that there was state participation in the creation of the cove-
nant system should be entitled to presumptive support.
The Shelley opinion did not take as broad a view of governmental ac-
tion as that just advanced. Instead, state participation was seen only in
the judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements. It is at this point
that substantial unease about the opinion has arisen. Does Shelley mean
that the freedom of action accorded private contractors is limited in all
respects by the same constitutional restraints imposed on the action of
public bodies? If it does not and cannot mean that, then what are the
circumstances that transform the attempted judicial enforcement of pri-
vate rights into state action violative of the fourteenth amendment?
The questions posed are of fundamental importance to all concerned
with maintaining the boundaries of the private world against the modem
assaults upon it. One substantial mechanism of the private world is the
system of private contract. A wide ranging freedom of contract is essen-
tial to the exertion of private volition in broad areas of social life, and to
the creation of what may be called private lawmaking. Paradoxically,
maintenance of a system of private contract is dependent on the availabil-
ity of public powers of enforcement. The very concept of a right of pri-
vacy presupposes access to public power to buttress the private world, for
"rights" are the product of governmental power. In most situations, it is
reasonable and necessary to assume that in enforcing private rights the
state is not adopting as its own the purposes and methods of the private
parties. We do not assume that the state approves the purposes of the
neo-Nazi when it safeguards his freedom to speak. So also in the con-
tract area, the state, in enforcing an agreement, does not ordinarily adopt
or place its imprimatur on the purposes of the parties. Rather, the state
action in these cases is independent of the calculations of private parties,
and consists of the neutral implementation of a system of contract within
76. When a widely diffused public interest has become enmeshed in a network of multitu-
dinous arrangements and governmental machinery has been invoked for the effectuation of
such arrangements, that public interest cannot be submerged by abstracting one such ar-
rangement from its context and treating it as though it were an isolated private covenant
immune from the prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 80. Cf. Note, supra note 16, at 747.
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which private individuals may pursue their multiple and sometimes con-
flicting ends.
The question, then, is did the enforcement of the racial covenants prior
to Shelley by state and lower federal courts amount simply to the neutral
enforcement of equitable restrictions on land? The conclusion which I
reached forty years ago, and which has been reinforced by my recent
revisitation of the cases, is that something considerably more occurred.
There is substantial evidence, I believe, that the states placed enforce-
ment of racial restrictions in a favored category, and that by word and
act introduced into the public policies of the states the purposes of those
who drafted and signed the racial covenants.
Defending judicial enforcement of restrictive agreements as simply
manifestations of private contractual freedom neglects the unique aspects
of the racial covenant system. Comparison with ordinary contracts of
employment may prove useful. Employment contracts, of course, con-
strict the power of third parties to engage those already bound by con-
tracts of hire. But restrictive covenants constrict the contractual power
of tens of thousands of fellow citizens, and judicial enforcement of the
covenants was tantamount to reconstructing the urban social structure to
the acute disadvantage of those of lesser economic and political power.77
That these policy issues, crying for consideration, were largely ignored or
summarily dismissed by state and lower federal courts constitutes no
bright page of American legal history.78 Surprisingly, judges, confronted
by requests for extraordinary equitable remedies to enforce racially re-
77, Thus, California Attorney General Robert W. Kenney stated in his amicus brief at iv in
Anderson v. Auseth, L.A. No. 19,759, on appeal to the California Supreme Court, Sept. 4, 1946:
Although these actions are entitled as though they were between private litigants this is not
really the fact. Whole sections of the population are to be affected by the final outcome of
this litigation. Some persons of one race seek to fence in all persons of another race and by
agreement among themselves have attempted to fix the bounds of the habitations of an-
other race.
Quoted in Vose, supra note 12, at 124-25.
78. In response to the argument that enforcing restrictive covenants would work hardship on
some 50,000 black persons in Kansas City because of a shortage of housing, a Missouri court re-
sponded that it could not agree "that the property of any person may be confiscated for private
purposes simply because some one, regardless of race and color, fancies a particular house and covets
it and no other." Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 1152, 115 S.W. 2d 529, 533 (Kan. City Ct.
App. 1938). A few American judges responded affirmatively to the public policy argument. Thus,
the late Justice Roger Traynor asserted in a concurring opinion that enforcement of the covenants
"must yield to the public interest in the sound development of the whole community." Fairchild v.
Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 831-35, 151 P. 2d 260, 267-69 (1944). In his influential dissenting opinion in
Hurd v. Hodge, Judge Edgerton pitched a substantial portion of his argument on public policy
grounds. 162 F. 2d at 237.
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strictive covenants, rarely appeared to assign weight to, or even to per-
ceive as relevant, the Supreme Court's finding that municipal ordinances
designed to segregate residential housing were lacking in substantial re-
lationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare.79
One of the most striking features of pre-1948 state racial covenant law
was the persistent reluctance of the courts to apply doctrines limiting the
enforcement of restrictive agreements, doctrines that had first emerged in
cases involving other kinds of equitable restrictions."° For instance, with
respect to other restrictions, the "changed circumstances" doctrine had
been given wide currency: if conditions involving the restricted property
have so altered that it is no longer possible to achieve the purposes of
those who created the restriction, then equity will not enforce the restric-
tion."' Many litigants attacking racial covenants sought to rely on the
doctrine, usually to no avail.8 2 One court held, for example, that even if
a small racially restricted tract became completely surrounded by
properties occupied by black persons, the restriction would continue as
long as no black occupants had penetrated the restricted area. 3 One
Missouri case stated that even if changed circumstances made the land
more valuable if freed from the restriction, the covenant would be en-
forced because "[t]here are some rights more valuable than money."8 4
Even more arresting was the position of state courts with respect to the
basic doctrine of property law forbidding or limiting restraints on aliena-
tion. According to the Restatement of Property as it appeared at the
time:
The underlying principle which operates throughout the field of property
79. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81-82 (1917).
80. If the courts which enforce such covenants were merely applying a general rule that all
restraints on alienation are enforceable, that might be one thing. It is quite another when
the courts do not enforce all restraints on alienation, but do approve those which are based
on race and color.
Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 77.
81. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39.
"Application of the rule strikes a balance between the pressure for redevelopment and the desire for
stability." French, supra note 35, at 1300.
82. "Change of circumstances is the usual ground for non-enforcement, but the change must be
'radical', and some courts insist that the change be in property covered by the covenants rather than
the surrounding property, a requirement that seems almost impossible to fulfill." Groner and
Helfeld, supra note 13, at 445. Cases in which the defense of changed conditions proved successful
include Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P. 2d 260 (1948); Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166,
44 S.W. 2d 857 (1931).
83. See, e.g., Pierce v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 311 Mo. 262, 295, 278 S.W. 398, 408 (1925).
84. Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 1152, 115 S.W. 529, 534 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1938).
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law is that freedom to alienate property interests one may own is essential
to the welfare of society .... Thus to uphold.. .[such restraints], justification
must be found in the objective that is thereby sought to be accomplished or
on the ground that the interference with alienation in the particular case is
so negligible that the major policies are not materially hampered.8 5
Of the five factors listed that would weigh against upholding the re-
straint, the fourth was that "the restraint [was] unlimited in duration,"
and the fifth that "the number of persons to whom alienation [was] pro-
hibited [was] large."86 In fact, many racial covenants restricted the
rights of non Caucasians in perpetuity or for long terms of years;87 and in
many cities the covenants barred tens or even hundreds of thousands of
persons from ownership of the restricted lands.88 As the Government
observed in its amicus brief:
It is doubly significant that the only cases in the United States upholding
the exclusion of a social group of considerable size are the racial covenant
cases, and, that, except for a single case from a non-common law jurisdic-
tion . . . all these cases were decided after ... [the Supreme Court] had
struck down legislative housing segregation in Buchanan v. Warley .... 89
The courts offered varied justifications as they ordered enforcement of
racial covenants. In one of the first state appellate cases, a Louisiana
court said:
[I]t would be unfortunate if our system of land tenure were so hidebound,
or if the public policy of the general government or of the state were so
narrow, as to render impracticable a scheme such as the one in question in
this case, whereby an owner has sought to dispose of his property advanta-
85. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 2379-80 (1944).
86. Id. at 2407.
87. Thus in the two state cases before the Court in Shelley, one involved an agreement with no
time limitation and the other was agreed to be effective for fifty years. 334 U.S. at 4, 6.
88. The racial factor apart, it would seem clear that a restraint which perpetually excluded
at least a quarter of the population of the District of Columbia, and some 20,000,000
American citizens, should not be upheld. The owner's freedom to convey would plainly be
substantially impaired, and no adequate counterbalancing considerations could exist.
Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 115. Despite the stated criteria, the Institute approved
a provision upholding racial restraints "in states where the social conditions render desirable the
exclusion of the racial or social group involved from the area in question." RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY § 406 comment 1 (1944).
89. See Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 107-08. A few American courts invali-
dated racial restrictions as unlawful restraints on alienation. See, e.g., Title Guarantee and Trust Co.
v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 P. 470 (1919). A West Virginia court invalidated a covenant
restricting sales of property to black persons, but upheld the restraint on occupancy. White v.
White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S.E. 531 (1929).
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geously to himself and beneficially to the city wherein it lies.90
A Michigan court appeared to rest its holding, in part, on the validity
of racial segregation as a state policy, citing Plessy v. Ferguson91:
The law is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
which some citizens do draw on account of racial differences in relation to
their matter of purely private concern. For the law to attempt to abolish
these distinctions in private dealings between individuals would only serve
to accentuate the difficulties which the situation presents.92
The Missouri court quoted earlier 9a spoke of the proper willingness of
the courts to protect the covenantor's investment in "happiness and
security." 94
These cases suggest that the state common-law rules which Shelley
condemned as unconstitutional were not simply reflective of a neutral
policy of contractual freedom.95 In addition, the courts were embracing
the covenants' objective of residential racial segregation as consistent
with a variety of state ends, including maintenance of public order, pro-
tection and enhancement of property values, and, in some instances, ra-
cial purity.96
The foregoing is perhaps sufficient to express my conclusion that the
90. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 727, 67 So. 641, 642 (1915).
91. Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 627, 188 N.W. 330 (1922) (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
92. Parmalee, 218 Mich. at 628, 188 N.W. at 331.
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
94. Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 1160, 115 S.W. 2d 529, 535 (Kan. City Ct. App.
1938). Frequently, restrictive agreements were upheld on the argument of "reasonableness." Thus
in Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 5, 291 P. 822, 823 (1930), the court said:
A person who owns a tract and divides it ... for the purpose of selling one [tract] or more
may prefer to have as neighbors persons of the white race and may believe that prospective
purchasers... would entertain a similar preference, and would pay a higher price if the
ownership were [so] restricted .... Surely, it is not unreasonable to permit such a person to
insert in his deeds a provision restricting, not only the occupancy, but also the ownership of
tracts conveyed by him.
95. In short, the carving out of racial real estate limitations from the application of the
common-law rule against restraints on alienation has largely resulted from ... sympathy
with, or affirmative acceptance of, the social interest in racial residential segregation, rather
than from a development of the original policy premises of the common-law doctrines of
free alienability.
Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 114. See also Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 So. 801
(1926), where the court interpreted a lease lacking a written restriction as containing an implied
covenant against leasing to black persons because the building provided only a common toilet to be
used by white tenants occupying the adjacent apartment. Cf. Shulte v. Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213
N.W. 102 (1927).
96. "No excuse for other forms of social segregation and discrimination is so potent as that one
that sociable relations on an equal basis between members of the two races may possibly lead to
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result reached in Shelley v. Kraemer was correct. This is true whether
one takes note of the contributions of state governmental power to the
creation of the covenant system, or whether consideration is confined to
judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements. But asserting the con-
stitutional correctness of the result reached on the facts of Shelley does
not resolve the question of how the precedent should be applied to other
facts. And doubts about the future applicability of Shelley pervade the
scholarly literature. I must at this point resort to conclusory statements.
Since we are not prepared to sacrifice substantially the values either of
the public or the private worlds, the courts must perform a balancing of
those values either explicitly or covertly, in future applications of Shelley.
The courts must strike a balance after consideration of such factors as
the magnitude of the harms complained of by the moving party, the de-
gree of participation of official power in producing the harms, and the
extent to which rectification of the harm through constitutional remedies
trespasses on the precincts of the private world. 97
This is by no means an entirely happy assertion. Attempts to balance
these imponderable considerations have not provided the Supreme Court
of the United States with its finest hours.9a It is a process that often
exalts the personal element in judicial decisionmaking. Nor have the re-
sults always been acceptable. For example, the present Court has moved
a fair distance toward balancing the fourth amendment out of its crucial
role in monitoring and containing official powers in American law en-
forcement. It has done this not only by dismantling the exclusionary
rule, but also by significantly constricting the substantive scope of the
amendment. 99
Yet there is little reason to despair about the place of Shelley v. Krae-
mer in our constitutional jurisprudence. Shelley represents the heavy ar-
intermarriage." G. MYRDAL, supra note 47, at 606 (emphasis in original). See also C. VOSE, supra
note 12, at 66:
The most important defense of the white race was established through state miscegenation
laws which made it a crime for white and colored persons to marry. Residential segrega-
tion was the next most important means of maintaining racial purity. Thus the restrictive
covenant can be viewed as a method of enforcing social theory.
Racial purity was one of the express purposes of those defending racial ordinances in the Supreme
Court. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
97. See Henkin, supra note 62, at 491-96.
98. Professor David Haber has ably delineated some of the difficulties accompanying the bal-
ancing approach in the context of the Shelley case. See Haber, supra, note 17.
99. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989).
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tilery of civil rights law. It has been and should be used sparingly. One
of the reasons for its apparent neglect is the proliferation of civil rights
legislation at both state and federal levels since the case was decided.
Many of the modem issues are resolvable within the more restricted pa-
rameters of statutory law. When resort to legislation is available, a kind
of Ockham's Razor directs us to take that course, and to avoid the mas-
sive confrontations of values likely to be engendered by invoking the
Shelley precedent. Still, however infrequently the precedent is sum-
moned, I am among those persons happy to have Shelley v. Kraemer in
our constitutional armory.
It has been more than forty years since on a May morning in 1948
Chief Justice Vinson peered across the courtroom and began a deliberate
verbatim reading of the Court's opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer. Ordina-
rily, the Justices give only truncated oral versions of the opinions they
have written, sometimes doing little more than announcing outcomes.
The Chief Justice, however, believed that the full rendition of the opinion
from the bench was justified, given the portentous nature of the decision.
Was he correct in assigning such importance to the Shelley case?
Certainly, Shelley v. Kraemer has not brought an end to racial discrim-
ination in the sale and lease of residential property. The problems have
proved especially obdurate. After Shelley, twenty years elapsed before
the passage of the housing provisions in the federal civil rights legislation
of 1968.10' Another twenty years were required before new legislation
could be enacted to strengthen the protections of the old. 101 Fear, greed,
ignorance, and poverty are with us still, and we continue to feel the social
dissonance they engender with particular force in the housing area. The
word "Yonkers" is sufficient to make the point. 102
Yet the record of Shelley has not been one of futility. The holding did,
after all, eliminate judicial enforcement of racial covenants, one of the
most devastating instrumentalities of racial segregation yet to emerge.
Perhaps of greater importance, Shelley lifted the issues of residential seg-
regation to a new and higher level of moral discourse; and this effect
100. The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1982).
101. Act of Sept. 13, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102
Stat.) 1619.
102. Feron, How Yonkers Came to a Sad Impasse, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1988, at E5.
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continues to be felt. Whatever the intricacies of "state action" in federal
constitutional law, millions of Americans detected the unmistakable
stamp of governmental connivance in newspaper pictures showing the
sheriff forcibly conducting members of a dazed black family from their
home to stand by a few personal possessions piled on the sidewalk. Fur-
ther scenes of this nature would have done no service to the conduct of
American foreign policy, as the nation in 1948 undertook the obligations
of leader of the western world. 103
It is important, also, to see Shelley as a vital part of a legal current
moving to the statutory and constitutional protection of minority rights.
The decision supplied a powerful source of morale and confidence for
subsequent civil rights struggles. Indeed, perhaps the best way to sense
the continuing significance of Shelley v. Kraemer is to ask: What would
the history of human rights in the United States have been had the Court
announced in 1948 that the great moral imperatives of the fourteenth
amendment were irrelevant to the system of racial discrimination created
and sustained by the restrictive agreements? In short, what if Shelley had
been decided the other way?
103. "The broad implications of restrictive covenants are entirely inconsistent with the future
national and international welfare of the United States in its relations with the non-white peoples.
This Department firmly believes that the cancer of restrictive covenants should be excised from this
nation." Letter of Under Secretary of the Interior, Oscar L. Chapman, Nov. 10, 1947, quoted in
Brief for the United States, supra note 11, at 19.
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